The Windows Phone developer business experience

Posted on January 5, 2013 by halberenson

This morning a blog entry by Steve Behrendt got me thinking about what the business experience must be like for Windows Phone developers.  Actually it is more than Windows Phone developers, it is developers for any of the app stores.

Prior to Apple introducing the modern concept of an app store a developer would, for the most part, have to implement all the components of a modern business in order to succeed.  They’d need to put real money into marketing, sales, and service.  Since the late 90s they could use the web to explain their product, sell, and even download the application to customer systems.  But often they still needed traditional sales and promotional activities as well.  You did a lot of PR.  If you were lucky enough a major publication published a review of your app.  You got a booth at a trade show to push your product.  You worked on deals to distribute your product through third parties.  Etc.  Today a lot of developers submit their apps to an app store and sit back waiting for the money to flow in.  Guess what, it wouldn’t have generally worked in the pre-app store days and it doesn’t work any better with an app store.

After reading Steve’s blog post I set out on a modern style attempt to find an expense tracking app for Windows Phone.  Steve’s app, traXs, did not show up in the first 5 pages of results on a Bing search for +”windows phone” expense tracking app nor on the first page of results for an expense tracking search I did at windowsphone.com.  When I expanded the windowsphone.com results to include all expense tracking apps I had to scroll to almost the bottom of the list to find traXs.  And then I noted it had no ratings and no reviews.  I’ll get back to that.

I tried the same search with Google with the same results.  TraXs just doesn’t show up in search results for Windows Phone expense tracking applications.  An explicit search for traXs found a few results, including an apparent website (which is also listed in their Facebook entry).  However attempting to access the website returned an HTTP 500 error.  Someone searching for an expense tracking app for Windows Phone would likely never come across traXs, and if they did they wouldn’t trust it was for real.

The lack of a rating or review really confuses me.  Steve’s blog has a chart that shows they’ve had 29 downloads.  None of those, not even acquaintances of the developers, has bothered to rate or review the app.  I have no way to judge traXs versus the other expense tracking apps, but with the others having ratings and reviews, and their even being free competitors, it is hard to see why someone would even download the trial of traXs.  A user is likely to try a small number of the better reviewed apps and either find one they like or give up completely.  They aren’t likely to get around to trying traXs, even if it turns out it would have been the perfect answer for them.

Steve’s blog post includes the observation that “there is absolute no correlation between downloads and price”.  This is a good point and one that developers need to keep in mind.  There is Free and Not Free.  (Actually, I think it is Free, Not Free, and Expensive.)  It doesn’t matter if Not Free is $.99, or $1.99, or in fact $.25 (if that were allowed) the moment you charge for an app the dynamics change entirely.  Many (maybe most) people won’t pay for an app, especially if there is a free alternative.  Once they decide to pay there is quite a bit of insensitivity to price.  That’s why Microsoft is comfortable charging more for Office 365 than Google is charging for Google Apps.  And why the Windows 8 store set a minimum price of $1.49 rather than the industry standard $.99.  Analysis of Price Elasticity (most likely) showed that setting the price of the small business edition of Office 365 at $72/year would make little difference in sales volumes vs. Google’s $50/year.  The same for the $1.49 vs $.99 situation.  Most likely unit volumes drop slightly but total revenue goes up significantly.  But the real lesson here is the Free vs Not Free dynamic.

Angry Birds has about the best name recognition in the App world.  If Rovio put out a version tomorrow called “Angry Birds Take-Your-Wallet” thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of people would buy it sight unseen.  Yet most of the world got hooked on Angry Birds through free versions.  You make an app Free either because you have an alternate means of monetization (e.g., the Wall Street Journal app is free but useless without a subscription) or you do it as part of your marketing effort.  Unless you have significant brand name recognition and/or an ability to heavily promote your app and/or an actual sales organization, you need to use Free as a means of building a customer base.  Yes the freemium model is a difficult one, yet represents the best option for cracking the consumer (and very small business) market.

Trials are not the same thing as Free.  I believe most users don’t even look at Not Free apps to see if they have a trial unless they are looking to buy eventually.  Sometimes trials are limited versions of the app, sometimes they are ad-supported versions of the app, and sometimes they are full versions that expire after a few days.  Whichever the case, the user makes the assumption that a trial is just that.  It is a way to try the Not Free app before buying it and not something they are expecting to be able to use indefinitely.  Use a trial for what it is intended, not as a substitute for having a Free version of your app.

I’m not claiming to be an expert on business of app store apps, I’m just applying some common sense (and overall business experience) here.  In the first couple of years of the iPhone “build it and they will come” actually somewhat worked.  But today, unless you are in it as a hobby, success requires the same level of business acumen as in the pre-app store era.

I didn’t mean to pick on Steve, he just provided an example to comment on.  Hopefully he and his associates are looking at what a real business plan would be for traXs.  They need to put at least as much effort into marketing as they did into development.  And, assuming they are all developers rather than business people, they may need to bring a marketing-oriented business person in to help.

And if you are a developer looking at building an app for Windows Phone, Windows 8, Android, IOS, or any other platform then get prepared to party like its 1999.  Because while specific tactics may be hugely different in 2013 the basic business requirements necessary to succeed haven’t changed all that much.

Posted in Computer and Internet, Mobile, Windows Phone | Tagged , , | 17 Comments

Collaboration

Posted on January 3, 2013 by halberenson

I know I’m going to get in trouble for this one.  I’ve been holding my tongue.  But it is just too good.  It’s fiction.  Not to say it wasn’t inspired by bits and pieces of reality…

Two organizations enter a room to discuss collaborating.   Org A is a moderate sized business.  Org B is the proverbial 8000 pound gorilla business.

Org B tells Org A that they’ll be happy to collaborate as long as Org A is part of Org B’s planning process, conforms with Org B’s development practices, and ships on Org B’s schedule.  Further, Org B won’t accept any work from Org A nor do anything for Org A unless it is part of the priorities and scenarios that have been identified as the release priorities for Org B’s business.  Org B isn’t budged by pleas that Org A’s business needs their help.  Instead Org B suggests it is ok not to collaborate, as they make the shape of a gun with their hand and gesture it towards Org A.  Org A realizes that this is slavery, not collaboration.

Org A is feeling pretty bad about this slavery thing but it is about to get worse.  They go next door to another conference room where Org C, another 8000 pound gorilla, is waiting to talk about collaboration.  Org C says they’ll be happy to collaborate as long as Org A is part of Org C’s planning process, conforms with Org C’s development practices, and ships on Org C’s schedule.  Further Org C won’t accept any work from Org A nor do anything for Org A unless it is part of the priorities and scenarios that have been identified as the release priorities for Org C’s business.  Org C isn’t budged by pleas that Org A’s business needs their help.  Instead Org C suggests it is ok not to collaborate, as they make the shape of a gun with their hand and gesture it towards Org A.  Org A leaves the meeting, heads for the nearest bar, and orders up a shot glass of Hemlock.

Meanwhile Org B and Org C go into a conference room to discuss collaboration.  I don’t know what they say to one another, but whatever they come up with looks a lot like Office 2013 on Windows 8.

Posted in Uncategorized | 17 Comments

There is no ARM in Windows RT

Posted on January 2, 2013 by halberenson

Windows RT is the name of Microsoft’s version of Windows 8 for ARM processors, right?  It’s aimed primarily at Consumers, right?  It’s role in business is primarily in the BYOD realm, right?  That’s so 2012!  Let’s talk about strategy and where I think Microsoft will go with Windows and particularly Windows RT.  And how their strategy may become more obvious in 2013.

The name Windows RT wasn’t chosen to convey a message about Windows moving to ARM processors.  Nor was it chosen to convey that it was a Tablet OS.  The name appears to have been chosen primarily for one reason, it is an operating system devoted to running Windows RunTime apps.  It splits the mainstream Windows product into two families.  Windows for running Win32 “desktop” and Windows RunTime applications and Windows RT that drops the legacy Win32 application support.  Windows RT is Microsoft’s go forward client operating system, while Windows is the operating system Microsoft will need to keep selling and enhancing for a transition that will last a decade or more, but it will eventually be considered a legacy.

I know I just sent a lot of people’s blood pressure through the roof because today they either (a) dislike Metro/Modern/whatever-you-call-it ,Windows RunTime, or the Start Screen and/or (b) the new environment isn’t really suitable for their usage scenario.  But keep in mind I’m talking about where things are going over several releases of the re-imagined Windows.  There will be many refinements, improvements, and changes before Windows RT replaces Windows as Microsoft’s primary client operating system offering.

The desktop lives forever, right?  Well, on Windows yes but not on Windows RT.  Today Windows RT only needs the desktop for two reasons.  First, many traditional utilities from the File Explorer to much of system management are only available as desktop apps.  Second, Microsoft Office is only available as desktop apps.  But in each release going forward this will become less true.  A Metro File Explorer will become standard.  More and more system management will move to the new model.  And eventually Microsoft will remove the desktop from Windows RT.  Then it will be able to remove many pieces of legacy (including Win32), making Windows RT smaller, faster, and more secure (via smaller attack surface) than it’s Windows sibling.

Microsoft started the ball rolling with Windows RT on ARM because that was the most practical thing to do.  With ARM unable to run existing x86 apps Microsoft had to decide if it would evangelize conversions of existing applications to ARM or put the energy into getting developers to write new Metro/Modern apps.  And without a library of Modern apps it was unlikely that any of the x86-oriented OEMs would create an x86 Windows RT system.   No rational amount of pricing difference on Microsoft’s part would encourage a OEM to use an operating system with no applications when they could just as simply use one with a huge, if aging, library.  ARM thus became the obvious place to introduce Windows RT.

As the library of applications in the Windows Store grows it becomes more and more likely that Microsoft will introduce Windows RT for x86 systems.  Will that happen in 2013?  By the end of 2013 the Windows Store will likely have in excess of 150,000 Apps.  Perhaps in excess of 200,000.  Assuming that the quality is there (meaning they are the apps people want and are equal to their iPad and Android equivalents) the market for systems with no need to run legacy desktop apps will have grown dramatically.  Microsoft, many of its OEMs, and Intel (of course) will want the option of using Clover Trail (and its follow-ons) in those systems.  So it is quite possible that Microsoft makes Windows RT available for Clover Trail-based systems in 2013, and it seems a certainty for 2014.

As a side note this is something that Paul Thurrott will probably not be happy about.  Paul has called on Microsoft to use Clover Trail in its next generation of the Surface so that it would have the full Windows experience.  But I expect that if Microsoft did use Clover Trail in a Surface (as opposed to Surface Pro) replacement that system would still run Windows RT.  Sorry Paul 🙂

If Windows RT for x86 is speculative in 2013 here is something I think is a surer bet.  Windows RT will expand into a family that mirrors the editions of Windows.  I expect that in 2013 we will see a Windows RT Enterprise (and perhaps Pro as well) edition.  Why?  Well the current edition of Windows RT is missing some key functionality that would accelerate its adoption within Enterprises.  And I’m not even talking about UI or Windows RunTime changes that would increase the application space it was applicable to.  I’m talking purely about lower level operating system features.

Being able to participate in a domain is part of Microsoft’s secret sauce for enterprises, and today Windows RT can’t do that.  A Windows RT Enterprise edition would bring the ability to join a domain, use DirectAccess, use BitLocker, fully participate in Microsoft’s management capabilities, etc.  Whereas the solutions introduced in 2012 are acceptable for BYOD situations and some limited application scenarios, an Enterprise edition would allow Windows RT systems to participate as full members of the enterprise computing environment.

Windows RT Enterprise will not allow side-loading of desktop applications, but it may allow side-loading of limited types of system software.  As great as DirectAccess is (and given my involvement in it I’m biased, but then I also lived with it as my “VPN” for a year so know how fantastic the user experience is) most enterprises use Cisco VPNs.  And while Windows RT is certainly adequately protected with Windows Defender, IE SmartScreen, etc. most enterprises will want at least the management capabilities of enterprise-oriented security products and probably the ability to use their corporate standard (i.e., Symantec, McAfee, etc.) products and infrastructure.  Unless Microsoft addresses these adoption of Windows RT will be much slower than desired.

And what about requirements for access to desktop applications on Windows RT systems?  Many, perhaps most, enterprises are fine with using VDI to allow users of these systems to access desktop applications.  Some are downright enthusiastic.  But many do not want that access occurring off their corporate network.  Hence the need for the ability to join a domain, and use DirectAccess or VPNs when users need remote access.  You then run VDI over the corporate network.

Now we get to another wildcard in all of this, Office.  Today’s situation with Office being a desktop Win32 application on Windows RT, and only being available in the Home and Student edition, represents a major drag on Microsoft’s ability to move Windows RT forward.  Microsoft needs to either allow upgrade of the edition of Office on Windows RT to an Enterprise edition (including, for example, making Outlook available) or to move Office fully to Metro/Modern (likely in multiple editions).  They may do both given the time it could take to create a true Office RT.

An Office RT would benefit the entire Windows RT  and Windows 8 market and is the logical direction for Office to go.  But I find it hard to believe they can get to full equivalence with the Win32 Office apps in a year, let alone in a traditional longer release cycle.  We’ll see some, perhaps substantial, movement in this direction in 2013 but I don’t know how far Microsoft will get.  In the mean time they may find it prudent to release Office 2013 Enterprise (standalone and/or as part of Office 365) for Windows RT systems.  However this rolls out, Microsoft will substantially improve the Office for Windows RT situation in 2013.

Finally, let me reinforce a point I’ve blogged about before.  Microsoft is moving to annual (or more frequent) updates as a (at least unofficial) corporate standard for release cycles.  There may be exceptions from time to time, but I’d expect pretty much every actively developed product to have annual releases.  That means faster evolution in smaller chunks is the norm.  You don’t like how the Start Screen works today?  By the end of the year there will no doubt be improvements that address major complaints.  Windows RunTime missing an API that keeps you from creating a Metro/Modern version of your App?  You might have it later this year.  Can’t stand that the Share contract doesn’t work with Outlook?  Again, a solution may appear faster than Microsoft customers have ever imagined possible.

2012 was an exciting year for Microsoft and its customers.  2013 may be even more exciting, and delightful.

 

 

Posted in Computer and Internet, Microsoft, Windows | Tagged , , , , | 47 Comments

Intel and the Windows 8 Launch

Posted on January 1, 2013 by halberenson

Happy New Year!  As I let the coffee sink in and recover from last night’s “nerdly New Year”, which is what my wife called the attempt to get photos from a recent trip to play from a share on our Windows Home Server to our TV, I thought I’d make my first blog post of the new year.  A good ding of the Windows eco-system sounds like a perfect start to the year!

I’ve been asked about, and in some cases taken to task for dinging OEMs over, the impact of Intel’s shipment delay on the Clover Trail Atom processor on the Windows 8 launch.  Clover Trail is supposed to be Intel’s first real shot at showing it can make the x86 compete with the ARM vendors in the low-power market.  Many OEMs have designed new systems around Clover Trail, so when I write that the OEMs have failed to get Tablets and Convertibles into the market the push back is “blame Intel, not the OEMs”.  Well, I’m not letting OEMs off that easy.  Intel is indeed a villan in this story, but the OEMs still deserve most of the blame.

When it comes to Tablets, dockable or not, I agree that Intel’s failure to deliver Clover Trail on time is a primary contributor to the lack of devices on the market.  Intel promised, and appears to be delivering, an awesome chip.  But they missed the boat on availability leaving the Windows Tablet market almost exclusively to the ARM-based Microsoft Surface and ASUS VivoTab RT.  And I know that many, including Paul Thurrot, think that Microsoft should have used a Clover Trail rather than an ARM processor in the Surface so that it could run traditional desktop apps.  Of course, that would have meant the Surface missed the Thanksgiving selling season.  Now that would have been a disaster.  Oh, and I have a surprise prediction in my next blog entry that will definitely not make Paul happy.

Intel’s Clover Trail delay validated Microsoft’s decision to support ARM as an alternate processor architecture.  At the size and scope of both Intel and Microsoft neither can bet their survival on the success or failure of the other.  Wintel was always been a bit of a myth.  Both companies, even at their closest points, have always sought ways to retain their independence.  Microsoft has run Windows on MIPS, Alpha, and even IBM’s Power processors.  Windows CE has run on MIPS, PowerPC, and ARM for many years.  That mainstream Windows on these other architectures failed to catch on (or even ship in Power’s case) is a testament to many market factors, including Intel’s ability to stay ahead on both process and design technologies.

The biggest threat to Intel was actually AMD, whose decision to focus on a 64-bit variant of the x86 derailed Intel’s plan to make the IA-64 (Itanium) a replacement for the x86.  Intel was forced to adopt the now standard x86-64 architecture.  Intel has for its part always sought to make sure other operating systems supported its chips.  Their biggest coup was getting Apple to adopt the x86-64 for the Mac.  And they’ve been a large investor in the Linux community.  That the Microsoft/Intel partnership continues to be the most important and successful for both companies is not to be dismissed.  But they will, and must, continue to diversify away from one another.

I think that the Clover Trail delay is being over-played as the reason for the lack of compelling Windows 8 devices on the market this fall.  Tablets were betting on Clover Trail but Convertibles had far less of a dependency.  The Dell XPS 12 uses Intel Core processors that have been available since mid-2012, but I didn’t see one in the flesh until December 26th.  So does the Lenovo ThinkPad Twist, which also didn’t make it into retail until sometime in December.  So does the elusive ASUS Tai Chi.  The Core-based Lenovo IdeaPad Yoga 13 did make it into retail displays very early on, but actual availability has been very limited.  That leaves the Core-based Sony Vaio Duo 11  as the only convertible with any significant retail presence leading up to Christmas, but its odd keyboard design left many cold.  It is actually disappearing from retail outlets.

Even pure tablets that skipped Clover Trail couldn’t be found at retail during Windows 8’s first 6-8 weeks of life.  The Acer W700 is one such example.  The Samsung ATIV Smart PC Pro 700T is another device that wasn’t impacted by Clover Trail delays.  These devices are pricey and unlikely to achieve much volume with consumers, but that is a separate issue from them being AWOL during the Windows 8 launch.

So despite the Clover Trail delay the retail channel could have been stuffed with Convertibles and Tablets at, or within days of, the launch of Windows 8.

OEMs also have a responsibility for managing their supply chain.  Basically, with the schedule around Clover Trail pushing so close to Windows 8 launch they should have had backup plans.  Either a reliance on the earlier generation of Atom processors or on low-powered Core processors.  These would have entailed somewhat different strategies than we have today, for example focusing on lower price points or more business-oriented tablets.

Imagine if Acer had rolled out a more modestly updated W500′ at the $249-299 price point rather than the Clover Trail-based W510 at $499?  Sure a W500′ wouldn’t have been as power or performance competitive with ARM as Clover Trail allows.  On the other hand the price would have allowed Acer to garner huge attention and, along with the Surface, been the true talk of the Windows 8 launch.   Could you build a tablet at the lower price point?  Almost certainly given you didn’t push other specs too much.  For example, this device might have stuck with the W500’s 1024×768 screen.    Definitely an entry-level offering.

Are their other supply chain issues, besides Clover Trail, impacting the Windows 8 launch?  Yes.  A few players, Apple being the key one, have locked up most of the manufacturing capacity for touch screens.  It is entirely possible that Lenovo, Dell, HP, and even mighty Samsung have found themselves unable to obtain sufficient supply of touch screens to get even their non-Clover Trail designs into the retail channel.  I also think this is one of the factors behind Microsoft’s slow expansion of Surface distribution channels.  Microsoft may have managed the Surface launch based on the volume of touch screens they could obtain.

Which brings me to a final point.  For me the most frustrating part of the entire launch has been being bombarded by promotion (advertisements, press releases, launch events, reviews) of devices which were not available.  I can’t count the number of images of the Dell XPS 12 I’ve seen since Windows 8 launch, yet couldn’t actually touch one until December 26th.  I would rather have seen one or two compelling devices in retail, with all the promotion focused on them, for the first few weeks than being bombarded with vaporware messaging.  Microsoft, Intel, and the OEMs set an expectation about Windows 8 devices that hasn’t yet been met.  The blame is across the board, but I continue to believe that OEMs own the lion’s share of responsibility.  They could have done better.  Much better.

Posted in Computer and Internet, Microsoft, Windows | Tagged , , , , , , | 7 Comments

The so-called “Fiscal Cliff”

Posted on December 26, 2012 by halberenson

I know this isn’t IT or tech related, but for the next few days conversation is going to be dominated by the looming “Fiscal Cliff” more than by tech.  That’s sad for those of us who would much rather see good tech news.  So I wanted to make a non-partisan comment.

I’m not sure what people are really expecting for a solution to the “Fiscal Cliff”, but whatever we get is going to be no better from an overall economic impact perspective.

Really fixing the U.S. Government budget problem requires a massive reduction in spending, a beyond comprehension increase in taxes, and/or some mix of the two.  The problems with the plan of record (“sequestration”) is that it (a) applies no intelligence to how the cuts are applied, (b) relies on expiration of tax cuts enacted in the Bush years rather than specific application of tax increases or fixing the tax code, and (c) doesn’t fix spending problems with entitlements.  It is designed to make everyone unhappy.

I don’t get why people think there is going to be a “fix” to the Fiscal Cliff.  It’s called the Fiscal Cliff because of the fear that the combination of a large tax increase and large government spending cut will push the economy into recession.  But even if the House, Senate, and President agree on a replacement plan that situation is true.  Any replacement plan will include revenue increases equal to or greater than sequestration.  Any replacement plan must include spending cuts equal to or greater than sequestration.  That means we are going over the cliff no matter what form Washington manages to mangle it into.

Given that voters  decided to basically maintain the status quo in Washington we can’t expect much give on either taxes or spending cuts.  A Republican Congressman from a fiscally conservative district is hearing “we don’t care that Obama was re-elected, we still don’t want you voting for higher taxes and we want massive spending cuts” and a Democratic Senator is still hearing from his supporters “we want you to protect government programs and tax the hell out of the rich to do it”.  The amount of give either side has is pretty small.  In truth, the best deal either side is likely to get in the short-term is the one already in place.

So I’m in the camp that Washington should stop searching for a short-term fix to the Fiscal Cliff.  Instead they need to focus on the long-term problems of fixing the tax code, deciding on an appropriate discretionary spending level, and putting entitlements on a solid fiscal footing, all with our long-term economic health in mind.  I have definite opinions on how those should be addressed, but that would launch into a more partisan discussion that I want to keep out of this blog.  Until we have long-term solutions we can live with Clinton-era tax rates and reduced spending levels that are still way above where they were just a few years ago.

My bottom line is that one way or another we are going over the cliff.  Stop trying to pretty it up and focus instead on making long-term structural changes that will keep us from going over another cliff down the road.

With apologies to those itching to turn this into a discussion, I’m going to lock this blog post from comments since I don’t want it to become a distraction.  I’ve said my piece, and now we can return to technical topics.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Comments Off on The so-called “Fiscal Cliff”

A few odds and ends for a slow news day

Posted on December 25, 2012 by halberenson

Everyone else in the house apparently is still asleep, so I figure it’s a good time to write down some odds and ends!

I finally had a decent experience with Best Buy carrying Microsoft Surface.  The store in Parker Colorado had a Surface-specific kiosk.  It wasn’t the most attractive thing in the world, and its placement was odd (still in the mobile section, not with other tablets or PCs), but it seemed effective.  People were stopping by and looking.  And store associates from the PC department were taking people over to look at it.  I stood around and listened to part of one conversation and found the sales rep doing a nice job of selling Surface.  He was hindered by Best Buy’s security devices forcing him to explain how the hing works rather than show it.  And they had none in stock, so the customer couldn’t have one for Christmas.

News came out that Craig Mundie was starting down the path to retiring from Microsoft and that Eric Rudder was picking up his responsibilities.  There is nothing earth shattering about Craig leaving.  People do retire you know!  The impact of Craig’s departure is likely to be subtle in the short-term.  Microsoft will lose its most important public policy/government interaction executive.  Craig not only represented Microsoft, directly and through members of his organization, to governments he also operated as an influence on public policy-related matters into the product groups.

I want to thank Craig for a couple of interactions I had with him in my second stint at Microsoft.  First of all, he was one of the primary senior executive proponents of DirectAccess.  I have my doubts we would have made progress on DirectAccess, beyond its introduction, if not for Craig (and BobMu) keeping it front and center.  Second, when I was looking at a substantial acquisition that would have launched Microsoft into another vertical (on the scale of its Healthcare efforts) Craig gave me invaluable advice.

I’m really happy to see Eric stepping up to take on a mainstream role again at Microsoft.  Eric is by far one of the smartest people at the company.  A lot of us thought he should have replaced Bill as CSA, or at least taken on the parts of the CSA role that Ray Ozzie wasn’t interested in.  Eric has been relatively hidden from view for quite some time, pursuing an incubation effort and (perhaps) adding strategic insights into Senior Leadership Team discussions.   What I expect from Eric in his new role is for changes in how incubation is pursued and greater visibility in the pursuit of central strategic initiatives.  It will be easier for Eric to influence the product groups than it was for Craig.  I expect Eric will largely leave MSR alone, or at most pressure them even a little more on technology transfer to the product teams.

The biggest question mark around the Craig to Eric transition is that much of what happens with this role is based on the personal interests of the executive.  Microsoft’s efforts around Healthcare likely would not have happened without Craig’s strong interest in the area.  Eric’s own interests will translate into somewhat different incubation priorities.

Ok, everyone is awake and waiting for me to stop blogging and get on with the day.  So signing off for now.

 

 

Posted in Microsoft | Tagged , , , | 7 Comments

Putting Expression Studio’s demise in perspective

Posted on December 22, 2012 by halberenson

Microsoft’s recent move to disband the Expression Studio suite, and discontinue some of its component products, is the latest example of a retrenchment that is returning the Developer Division (DevDiv) to its roots.  Understanding that history will help make sense of the last couple of years of DevDiv moves, whether you think they make sense or not.

If you go back to the early 90s DevDiv had a fairly straightforward charter.  Its job was to create tools and technologies that attracted developers to the Microsoft platforms.  Pretty much Compilers, IDEs, and wrappers to make the underlying platform (i.e., Windows) more accessible.  From a business perspective DevDiv was designed as a Cost Recovery business.  That is, to keep it from becoming a drain on overall profits it was expected to break even.  In the high growth rate 90s, and with overall sales of development tools a relatively small part of Microsoft’s revenue stream, Microsoft could absorb a 0% margin on its development tools without harming its corporate bottom line.

By the mid-90s DevDiv found itself focused on two new areas, Enterprise and Web development.  On the Enterprise front DevDiv was (and is) subject to the same economics as other businesses (like SQL Server) in that Enterprise-oriented features are very expensive to develop but yield only marginal increases in unit sales.  If you want to continue to break even that means you have to either raise your prices or introduce tiered pricing (or both), or sell the capabilities separately.

Web development had a similar effect in that vastly increased engineering resources were required, outstripping the ability for unit volume increases to keep DevDiv at break even.  The net impact on this was for there to be continually increasing attention on the higher priced editions of the tool set (which by the late 90s was lumped into a Visual Studio family).

But Web development would eventually have an even larger impact.  The first big change was the introduction of .NET Framework and the Common Language Runtime (CLR).  The CLR had been proposed as early as 1994 (and maybe earlier), but it wasn’t taken seriously until the emergence of Java and its runtime as a serious platform competitor.  The .NET Framework created a conundrum for DevDiv as it represented its own platform rather than simply being a wrapper for underlying platforms.  This set up a competition between DevDiv and other parts of Microsoft (certainly Windows, but also Windows Mobile, Office, SQL Server, etc.) for ownership of the platform being promoted to developers.

The Web also allowed another platform competitor to emerge, Adobe.  Adobe’s Flash, AIR, and Flex represented another serious threat to Microsoft’s platforms.  Applications written using them were platform independent, and Flash itself had gained enormous market share as the only practical way to create rich media experiences on the web.  Moreover, Adobe’s business model was the exact opposite of Microsoft’s.  Whereas Microsoft provided development tools primarily in order to sell runtimes (e.g., operating systems), Adobe gave away runtimes in order to sell tools.  Adobe also specialized in entering the application lifecycle much earlier than Microsoft, establishing dominance in the design tool space.

Silverlight (with CoreCLR) and the Expression line of tools were established as a counter to the Adobe platform and business strategy.  This both flipped the business model on its head (give away runtime, make money on tools) and created new tensions between DevDiv as platform provider and DevDiv as creator of tools to attract developers to underlying platforms like Windows.

Meanwhile, as Java adoption by Enterprises picked up, Microsoft faced the dilema that IBM (Rational) and others were providing toolsets that more completely addressed the Application Lifecycle (ALM) than did Visual Studio.  Whereas many of these elements had previously been independent of the platform, if they existed at all, they now had ties to specific platforms.  This further drove Microsoft to expand its Enterprise (and large development team in general) tools offering.

As Microsoft’s growth slowed, DevDiv’s engineering expenses grew, and sales of development tools became a substantial revenue stream, DevDiv became a more noticeable drain on Microsoft’s margins.  To reduce the drain DevDiv would have to move beyond pure cost recovery to actually making money.  That added to the focus on ALM and Design Tools, where competitors like IBM and Adobe had created huge price umbrellas.

The result of all these developments was that DevDiv increasingly appeared to be its own Tools and Platform business rather than being focused on its original supporting role.  And then came the iPhone.   Yes, the iPhone was going to start the ball rolling on what I believe events of the last two years shows is DevDiv’s return to its traditional role.

One of the first things to note about the iPhone was that Apple made development tools available for free.  At the same time Microsoft was requiring mobile developers to purchase one of its premium versions of Visual Studio such as Professional.  For Windows Phone to succeed Microsoft was going to have to give away tools for mobile development.  Second, Apple eschewed any kind of plug-ins for the iPhone browser and designed the rules for the App Store to ban generic runtimes like those of Adobe.  As it turned out the iPhones huge success would end Adobe’s run at becoming a platform vendor.

To compete with the iPhone not only would Microsoft have to move mobile development from the Professional edition to the free Express edition, by basing its development platform on Silverlight it would have to make available a free version of the Expression Blend design tool as well.  Alternatively Microsoft could have created a separate, less powerful, design tool for Windows Phone.  But there was neither time nor desire to do so.  Expression Blend was a powerful way to give the Windows Phone development environment a leg up over Apple’s.

Apple’s blocking of Adobe’s runtime, the rise in HTML5 as a viable alternative to Adobe Flash, and additional platforms deciding to block plugins put the nail in Flash’s coffin.  And took Silverlight down with it.  Silverlight as a cross-browser/cross-platform capability was now neither strategically necessary nor even possible.

Then came Windows 8.  With Windows 8 the Windows team reaffirmed its position as the platform.  Instead of the .NET Framework being the platform for apps on Windows 8, its job is as a wrapper to enable the creation of managed code applications for the Windows Runtime.  DevDiv also reinvigorated its efforts around native code (i.e., C++) development in support of Windows 8’s app platform.  And Expression Blend once again ended up in a central role for app development, pushing it from Expression Suite into editions of Visual Studio.

There have also been leadership and structural changes within DevDiv.  How much of the leadership change can be attributed to a retrenchment from a “Tools and Platforms” business  back to a focus on a role supporting Microsoft platforms such as Windows is hard to gauge.  But I’m betting that has played a significant role.

So now we get to the recent Expression Studio changes.  Without Adobe as a platform competitor a lot of the business justification for Expression evaporated.  There is no free runtime in order to sell tools business model.  Expression Blend has already made its way into Visual Studio, making it superfluous to have a second suite built around it.  While Microsoft once was a leader in basic website design and HTML editing with FrontPage, its Expression Web successor doesn’t seem to have moved the needle.  Visual Studio has always been the tool for more sophisticated website development, so putting all the focus there instead of splitting it with Expression Web makes sense.

That leaves Expression Design as the one area that Microsoft is really just exiting.  I don’t know how successful Expression Design had become, but frankly I think most designers just continued to use Adobe’s tools.  Expression Blend was and is critical because it straddles the design/development disciplines.  But further you get from development the less the tools really are tied to any specific platform.   So with Adobe no longer a significant platform threat there is less pressure to try to unhook designers from Adobe’s tools.  Another way to look at it is that in the long history of coopetition between Microsoft and Adobe the pendulum has swung more towards the cooperation side.

I’m sure there are questions about what all this means for other areas, like development for Microsoft’s servers and its efforts around ALM.  I might comment on those in future postings but it would be too much speculation for this one.

The bottom line when you look at DevDiv over the last couple of years is that the days of it focusing on tools and its own platform as a business are over.  It has returned to its classic charter of being a supporting player responsible for attracting developers to Microsoft’s platforms such as Windows, Windows Phone, Windows Server, Azure, SQL Server, etc.  That’s the context you have to use in understanding any of its recent or future announcements.

Posted in Computer and Internet, Microsoft | Tagged , , , | 31 Comments

Does Microsoft have a Phablet Strategy?

Posted on December 20, 2012 by halberenson

Recent reports are that HTC cancelled a Windows Phone 8-based entry into the so-called Phablet category.  Phablets, for those who don’t follow these things, are crossover devices between Phones and Tablets with screen sizes starting at 5″.  I tend to think of them as Frankenstein Phones because I can’t see anyone carrying around a 4.0+” screen phone and a 5.0+” phablet.  The capabilities are just too close.  If you go the phablet route then you are probably someone who uses your device as a tablet 95% of the time but still needs phone capability because you don’t want to carry a phone as well.  So you are looking for the biggest thing you can get that still squeezes into a pocket.  A big pocket.

I thought Phablets were a category that was DOA, but Samsung’s success with the Galaxy Note proves there is a market for such devices.  Maybe I should have been more open-minded as Phablets are what we used to call PDA Phones.  That is devices that are PDAs with phone capabilities added to them, a category pioneered by Microsoft and Palm.  They disappeared after the iPhone came out, but apparently the desire for them remains.  This may be yet another case of Microsoft pioneering a category, abandoning it to others, then being forced to claw their way back into it.  So far though the category remains a niche.

The problem for Microsoft is that its strategy (as far as we know it) leaves such devices out.  HTC reportedly killed its effort because Windows Phone 8 doesn’t support a 1080P screen resolution.  That may be the case, though other factors might play here too.  The Samsung Galaxy Note II is a 5.5″ screen device, for example, and Windows Phone’s chassis definition (last I looked, which is a while ago) only supports devices up to 5″.   Samsung may have already pushed the definition of Phablet beyond where Windows Phone 8 can go.  Windows 8/RT doesn’t currently seem at all appropriate for devices below 7″ and has been so far focused on devices that are 10.1″ or larger.

There is another issue here of course.  Apple and Google have taken the approach of a fully common OS between phones and tablets (and different OSes for notebooks/desktops) whereas Microsoft uses common underpinnings but different OSes for phones and tablets with the tablet OS being common with notebooks and desktops.  For the Google Android world that means Phablets are just part of the continuum.  Microsoft can’t currently address the market that way.  No matter how big you make the screen, a Windows Phone 8 device is still going to be a smartphone and not a tablet and Windows RT is not going to be a smartphone.

Don’t weep too much for Microsoft.  It’s design decisions give it an advantage in the tablet to notebook continuum that is ultimately more valuable.  Not only that, so far Apple has eschewed the Phablet space confirming it might remain a fairly small niche.  So the question becomes, does Microsoft ignore Phablets completely?  If not, how are they going to address them?

One could read HTC’s product cancellation as an indication they don’t believe they can create a competitive device using Windows Phone 8, which is probably true.  Or one can read it as they learned what Microsoft’s real strategy is and decided that the device they planned no longer made sense.  In other words, did Microsoft give them a reason to redirect their resources to some other Microsoft-related effort?

Windows Phone is already on an annual release schedule (with minor updates more frequently) and that is what Windows is now expected to do as well.  In addition some rumors have a fall 2013 for both OSes that is more integrated than they currently are.  One suggested a merging of Windows Phone and Windows RT.  While I think more integration is obviously going to happen, it is hard for me to imagine full merging of the two in that timeframe. So it makes me wonder if one of the things coming in 2013 is a way to address the Phablet market.

Is there a “Windows RT Phone 8.1” Phablet OS in our future?  I’ll be looking for more hints of it as 2013 dawns.

 

Posted in Computer and Internet, Microsoft, Mobile, Windows, Windows Phone | Tagged , , , , , | 6 Comments

And now for another edition of How the Windows Eco-System Fails: Best Buy at its worst

Posted on December 18, 2012 by halberenson

I decided to pay a visit to my local Best Buy to see how things were shaping up for the final run up to Christmas.  Just after walking in the door I am greeted by this:

Center Island at Best Buy

Yes, the large Windows 8 display table in the center of the aisle is not displaying Windows 8 systems, it has been turned into a display stands for Beats Audio products.  Meanwhile, just to the right and perhaps ten feet away the store has the Microsoft Surface on display.  See it here:

Surface at Best Buy

The Surface is just dumped onto an ASUS table next to an ASUS Android tablet.  There is no Surface signage at all other than the price labels you can see in front of the unit.

Now to be fair there is a Windows-themed table over in the Smartphone section of the store that has another Surface on it along with an HP Touchsmart All-In-One and an HTC 8x Windows Phone.  And on the flip side of that table was an ASUS VivoTab RT, a Samsung ATIV Smart PC, and a Windows 8 notebook.  But there is no actual signage for the Surface.  The price tag over there reads $699, with no explanation whatsoever of what you are getting.  Literally all you know is “Microsoft Surface, $699”.  But why is this table over by Smartphones?  Why isn’t it in the Tablet/PC section of the store?  It isn’t as if these devices (other than the 8x) were being offered with data plans.  At least not as far as any signage showed.

Since it seems that Microsoft accelerated plans to get the Surface into stores the kiosks for displaying it probably aren’t expected until January.  But would it really be that hard to take the Beats Audio boxes off the Windows 8 display and put both Surfaces on it?  That would put them on an appropriate table in an appropriate section of the store.  And really, how hard would it be to send someone down to Kinko’s FedEx Office to get a large “Microsoft Surface” sign printed to put up behind the units?

Really Best Buy, this is embarrassing.

Posted in Computer and Internet, Microsoft, Windows | Tagged , | 31 Comments

Some Anti-Malware basics

Posted on December 17, 2012 by halberenson

This is not a blog post for the IT professional, unless you have little idea how anti-malware, reputation, etc. work.  It is a small primer for those who don’t quite get all this anti-malware stuff.

At its core anti-malware seems pretty straightforward.  You take something that can be run (usually an “image” or “executable”, but for sake of the audience we’ll just say App) and run a mathematical algorithm over it that produces an (almost) unique identifier for that App.  Generally that unique identifier is called a Hash (because of the technique used).  Anytime you run the same algorithm over the same App you get the same Hash.  Two different Apps with same name will have different Hashes.  Two Apps that are identical but have different names will get the same Hash.  If someone modifies an app, even slightly, it will have a different Hash.  So the Hash tells you exactly what you have.

Anti-Malware software simply computes the Hash for an App and compares it to a “Black List” of Hashes that have been deemed Malware.  Those updates your anti-Malware software does all the time are to update the Black List of Hashes (or Signatures) of known Malware.   While this technique was sufficient in the early (particularly pre-Internet) days, today the Malware can spread rapidly enough to be endemic before your Anti-Malware vendor adds its Hash to their Black List.  More recently Malware authors have taken to constant updating of the App with slight changes so that each copy has a different Hash, defeating the simple Black List mechanism.

With Black Lists of  shrinking effectiveness Anti-Malware has grown to incorporate more sophisticated techniques for detecting Malware.  The problem with these techniques is that they significantly slow down App execution, so another mechanism was needed to minimize their use.  That is the addition of a White List of App Hashes that are known to be safe to run.  Let’s say you go to run Microsoft Excel.  The White List will contain the Hash of Excel’s main executable, excel.exe, as known to have been distributed by Microsoft.  Anti-Malware just checks the Hash and lets Excel run with no further interference.  If the Hash doesn’t match then either excel.exe has been modified or some other App has an executable called excel.exe.  Either way, it won’t be mistaken for the real Microsoft Excel.

Most Apps you run will either be on the White List or Black List and thus Anti-Malware software either lets them run without further interference or blocks them.  But what happens when an App is not on either list?  That’s when the App will be deeply evaluated either before, or while, it is running.

The specific techniques for evaluating unknown Apps are beyond this blog posting but basically cover two broad areas.  The first, known as Generic Signatures, is for the Anti-Malware software to scan the image for known indicators that this is a particular kind of Malware.  This helps defend against the case where Malware authors simply keep issuing very slight modifications of their Apps as a way to avoid the Black List.  When a new example of the Malware App is found its Hash is sent to the Anti-Malware vendor so it can be added to the Black List (and thus blocked with less performance impact).

The second set of techniques are more dynamic, monitoring an App for suspicious behavior.  If suspicion that the App is Malware is high then execution is blocked, but if it is only slightly suspicious then it is allowed to proceed.  Information about the App may then be sent to the Anti-Malware vendor for analysis and a final determination on if it should be added to the Black List or White List.

Since traditionally unidentified Apps that have either no or only mildly suspicious behaviors are allowed to run it is possible for Malware to slip through these evaluation techniques.  To combat this more complete “Reputation” systems are being incorporated into Anti-Malware software as well as Operating Systems.  With Reputation, an App is only allowed to run if it is on the White List.  Unknown applications are completely blocked.  The problem with this approach in the past has been that many legitimate applications would be blocked, making systems almost unusable.  Recent advances have made Reputation far more practical, although in rare cases blocking of legitimate Apps will still occur.

Modern Reputation-based systems are more pro-active in adding Apps to the White List.  In particular they can look at the (verifiable) identity of the author of the App and, if they have a reputation for producing safe apps, automatically add any new (or legitimately changed) App to the White List.  Apps that engage in suspicious or clearly harmful behavior can be removed from the White List, blocking their execution.  This will also “damage” the reputation of the App’s author, making it more difficult for their Apps to be added to the White List.  Apps obtained from a tightly controlled “Store” like the Windows Store or Apple’s App Store receive the most direct reputation verification and are always on the White List (unless pulled from the Store).  By changing the focus of Anti-Malware from the Black List to the White List Reputation-based systems protect against Malware even before it is identified as such.

Other techniques contribute to fighting Malware as well.  URL Filtering uses a Black List/White List technique to keep users from navigating to web sites that are known to distribute Malware or have done so in the past.  Email Filtering removes Malware-infested images from mail, and keeps SPAM (many of whose links take you to Malware distributing websites) out of your Inbox.  Firewalls help block Malware from communicating to the outside world.

That’s the simple tutorial.  Hopefully one of the things it does is explain why Reputation is so important.  It’s really the only technique that gets ahead of the Malware authors.

Posted in Computer and Internet, Security | Tagged , | 4 Comments