Let me ask a simple question, when are we going to get serious about dealing with unauthenticated email and its associated Phishing and Malware risks? If you think the industry is already taking this seriously, and that it is simply a hard problem, you are (IMHO) just wrong. Take this little snippet from the Microsoft Office 365 documentation on their handling of inbound mail that fails a Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) check:
If the DMARC policy of the sending server is p=reject, EOP marks the message as spam instead of rejecting it. In other words, for inbound email, Office 365 treats p=reject and p=quarantine the same way.
In other words, in Microsoft’s infinite wisdom they ignore instructions from the domain owner to shred, incinerate, and bury deep in the earth mail that fails the checks they established to prove it comes from them, and instead put that mail in the Junk folder where 100s of millions of naive users will find it and believe it might be legitimate. This may have been a wise step back when DMARC was fresh and new in 2012, today it is simply irresponsible of Microsoft to favor legacy behaviors over a domain owner’s explicit instructions.
I don’t really want to pick on Microsoft, other than as a representative of the industry overall. We have the tools (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) to dramatically impact the SPAM problem but aren’t driving adoption, and proper usage, at a rate commensurate with the danger that unauthenticated email represents. SPF and DKIM have been with us for about 15 years. After 15 years we should no longer accept excuses such as SPF breaking legacy (pre-)Internet systems like listservers, there has been plenty of time for alternate compliant systems to be deployed. Unfortuntately nearly every SPF record seems to end with a soft-fail indicator, meaning “I don’t know who might legitimately send email on my behalf so don’t actually reject anything”. DMARC, which really brings SPF and DKIM into a useful framework, has only been adopted by 50% of F500 companies. And nearly all of them have DMARC policies of NONE, meaning just go ahead and deliver mail that fails authentication to the user’s inbox. WTF? And if they do take DMARC seriously only to have Microsoft ignore instructions to REJECT mail that fails authentication, it’s enough to make a CISO drink.
Is it going to take legislation to make the industry get serious? Maybe if Microsoft were subject to a lawsuit with treble damages because they delivered a malicious email to people’s junk folder rather than honor the DMARC REJECT policy we’d see some action. Not just by Microsoft, but by every organization fearful that new legislation had made it clear that failure to adopt well established anti-SPAM techniques subjected them to unlimited financial exposure.
We need a hard timetable for DMARC adoption, and if industry doesn’t do it then perhaps it will take a legislative push. In either case, we need a date by which all domains either establish a DMARC policy or have their mail rejected by recipient servers. We need a date by which a DMARC policy must be either REJECT or QUARANTINE. We need a date by which servers must enforce the DMARC policy rather than just check it. The later is actually the first thing to be tackled. If someone has taken the trouble to establish a policy, a server should enforce it! Hear that Microsoft? And we need a date by which REJECT is the only acceptable policy. Want to install some other milestones, fine. But let’s stop with the excuses. It really doesn’t matter if this is a problem of the perfect being the enemy of the good, or of competing interests, or just inertia. Throw out the excuses and DMARC or Die.